Global edition · Macro & micro outlook · September 2026
Governments do not need another lender. They need a settlement counterparty.
Non-performing loans and unhedged rate / currency exposure are the same problem seen from two sides: a cash-flow that has stopped matching its liability. Every government ultimately carries the residual — recapitalisations, bad banks, guarantee schemes, lost tax base. MPCL moves that residual off the state and back into a monitored, performing structure, routed through the UAE corridor and open from India to the United States.
DFSA Cat 3C
Licence CL7741 · Firm Ref. F009299
DIFC, Dubai
Park Tower B, Damac Park Towers
Professional Clients only
DFSA COB 2.3 & public-sector counterparties
Live structured products
3
DFSA-approved — each independently IP-registered
Licence
Cat 3C
DFSA CL7741 incl. Holding or Controlling Client Assets
Delivery
2 tracks
Track A credit & settlement · Track B treasury & hedging
Programme vehicle
USD 500M
Targeted co-ownership programme vehicle; first close USD 100–250M
The thesis
2026 is moderation with a downside skew — ~3.0% global growth, inflation back to ~4.4%, a Gulf supply shock, trade fragmentation and heavy public debt. Even the healthiest banking system in the world — the UAE at a 3.2% NPL ratio and 16.8% capital adequacy — books impairments in the billions and hedges over AED 100 billion of securities at a single bank. The problem is solved everywhere; it is solved expensively, with the state as last resort. The answer is a complete package, not a mortgage product.
The ask
Authorisation first, capital second. Recognise the co-ownership settlement framework and the pooled-hedge framework as permitted mechanisms for state banks and state-linked borrowers, nominate one portfolio and one hedging need for a defined programme, and let audited weekly results build the case for scale. Capital follows evidence; MPCL is built to produce the evidence.
Built for finance ministries · central banks & financial regulators · state-owned banks & remedial desks · national bad banks / ARCs / AMCs · housing finance agencies & guarantors · sovereign wealth funds & DFIs · infrastructure PSUs & municipalities · diaspora-facing institutions.
MPCL acts as originator, structurer, servicer and — where its DFSA-approved Regulatory Business Plan permits — guarantor. Never lender, never arranger of record, never retail-facing.
02 · Macro outlook
The World in 2026–27: Moderation with a Fragmentation Premium
Growth holds in aggregate; dispersion and the price of insurance against rate and currency moves have gone up. Both favour a settlement-and-hedging counterparty over a plain lender.
Global CPI 2026f
4.4%
+0.6pp vs prior forecast on energy, shipping and food
Global real GDP 2026f
3.0%
Advanced economies 1.8% · EMDEs 3.9% · US 2.3%
UAE CPI 2026f
2.3%
A low-inflation hub serving reflation-exposed spokes
UAE GDP 1.7% → 9.8%
Shock, then rebound
Hormuz disruption absorbed; 2027 on a 25.7% hydrocarbon surge
- 1 · Rate cycles down, desynchronised — CBUAE Base Rate 4.40% → 3.65% by Dec-2025 in lock-step with the Fed; the BoJ tightened; the 2026 shock re-opens the inflation question. Borrowers who assumed a one-way cutting path are exposed.
- 2 · A Gulf supply shock with global reach — Strait of Hormuz closure cut UAE oil output 34% YoY in March; shipping and insurance costs rose from India to East Africa.
- 3 · Fragmentation → corridors — Supply chains re-route along bilateral agreements. The UAE's CEPA network makes Dubai the clearing point for South–South trade; a corridor that clears goods can clear settlement and hedging flows.
- 4 · Debt constrains the backstop — Elevated public and private debt limits fiscal space. A state that cannot afford another recapitalisation needs private-capital settlement with no budget line.
- 5 · The India–GCC–US triangle — Dollar-pegged dirham, managed-float rupee, linked by remittances, local-currency settlement and diaspora property — a hedging market no household can access alone.
What the outlook means for the package
Slower growth + reflation risk → more borrowers whose instalment outruns income → Track A demand. Desynchronised rates + FX volatility → unhedged floating and cross-currency books → Track B demand. Fiscal constraint → governments prefer private-capital mechanisms with published results.
Sparring note
The consensus view is that lower policy rates will cure credit stress on their own. We disagree. Lower rates reduce new defaults; they do not resolve the stock already classified, nor help the borrower whose income sits in a different currency from his debt.
Sources: IMF WEO June 2026 as cited in CBUAE FSR 2025 and QER June 2026; CBUAE forecasts for the UAE.
03 · The non-performing exposure map
Headline NPL Ratios Are Low. The Exposures Moved; They Did Not Shrink.
| Market | Headline | Where the stock sits | MPCL entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| India · 2.3% GNPA | Down from an 11.2% peak in 2018 | ~28 ARCs, the NARCL bad bank and IBC resolution; unsecured retail, MSME and affordable-housing pockets re-emerging; large unhedged ECBs | GIFT City feeder into the DIFC programme; property-backed NPA co-ownership settlement for PSU banks and ARCs; pooled INR cross-currency hedge |
| UAE / GCC · 3.2% NPL | Net 1.5%; real-estate NPL 5.0%; finance-company net NPL 7.1% (peak 8.2% in 2020) | Legacy corporate workouts resolved committee-by-committee; the 2026 resilience cohort meets its forbearance sunset in 2027–28 | Par settlement or discounted purchase of property-backed classified accounts (~AED 500M initial book) with registry hold; Sleeping Period™ as an authorised framework |
| Europe · 1.9% NPL | Residual stock concentrated in Southern Europe | State-guaranteed NPL securitisations (GACS, Hercules) and legacy AMCs (SAREB, NAMA) hold the tails; CRE revaluation risk is live | Co-ownership exit for guaranteed securitisation tails; DIFC vehicle as neutral third-jurisdiction counterparty; EUR–USD–AED hedging |
| United States · ~1% bank NPL | Rate lock-in freezes mobility; office CRE distress and a maturity wall through 2027 | ~USD 7 trillion of agency-guaranteed mortgages with GSEs in conservatorship; regional-bank CRE concentration | Home-equity co-ownership pool for rate-locked households; CRE settlement counterparty for regional banks |
| Africa | Sovereign and quasi-sovereign arrears; thin domestic hedging markets | Arrears sit with finance ministries and state utilities rather than banks; dollar debt against local-currency revenue | Facilitator / arranger role (Angola USD 2.0B syndicated facility mandate as precedent); corridor hedging through DIFC |
Component 1
Migrated stock
Loans already inside ARCs, bad banks and AMCs on state-backed receipts — awaiting a resolution that is not a courtroom
Component 2
Forbearance-sunset cohort
Accounts restructured under 2020-era and 2026 relief packages that must perform or re-classify in 2027–28
Component 3
Unhedged cross-currency book
Performing today, invisible to NPL statistics, one 10% exchange-rate move from the classified column
04–05 · UAE anchor & micro outlook
The Corridor's Home Base — and What a Record-Low-NPL Bank Still Spends on the Problem
| UAE banking system | Q1 2025 | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total assets (AED bn) | 4,719 | 5,340 | 5,556 | +17.7% YoY |
| Gross credit (AED bn) | 2,240 | 2,570 | 2,696 | +20.3% YoY; foreign credit +50.1% |
| Bank deposits (AED bn) | 2,936 | 3,305 | 3,446 | +17.4% YoY; resident-led |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio | 76.3% | 77.7% | 78.2% | Below 5-year average — spare lending capacity |
| Capital adequacy · CET1 | 17.6 · 14.7 | 17.0 · 14.4 | 16.8 · 14.3 | RWA growth outrunning capital |
| NPL · net NPL ratio | 4.3 · 1.8 | 3.3 · 1.6 | 3.2 · 1.5 | NPL stock −10.7% YoY |
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank — 60.77% owned by Mubadala, ultimately the Government of Abu Dhabi — is the best possible stress-case for the thesis: if the package adds value there, it adds more value everywhere the ratios are worse. NPL ratio 1.83% (FY2025) with 146.4% provision coverage; AED 9.29bn impairment allowance at 30 June 2026; AED 5.23bn written off during 2025; AED 106.6bn of securities hedged for rate and FX risk inside AED 1.27tn of derivative notional.
Settlement releases provisions and capital
A counterparty that takes a classified property-backed account at par converts a provisioned exposure into cash. Specific-provision and capital release is the bank's gain; the borrower's retention is the state's gain; no new risk-weighted asset is booked because programme capital is third-party.
The swap desk is the Track B counterparty
A desk already running AED 700bn+ of rate and currency swaps prices a pooled notional of retail or PSU loans off its own curve. Fixed EMI for Life™ is another swap line for Treasury — not a credit-committee product. Routing decides pace.
Lesson from the first-line engagement
Three elements were rightly rejected by a first-line desk: reinvesting released equity in instruments pledged back to the same lender; refinancing classified borrowers as new credit; treating callable structured notes as hold-to-maturity. The package is redesigned around those objections — settlement not refinancing · third-party capital not bank funding · fair value not accounting arbitrage.
06 · The problem statement
Two Failures, One Root — Cash-Flow No Longer Matches Liability
| Conventional tool | What it does | Where it fails |
|---|---|---|
| Restructuring / moratorium | Extends tenor, defers instalments, capitalises interest | Total debt rises; account stays classified; forbearance has a sunset; no new cash enters |
| Enforcement / forced sale | Liquidates collateral | Fire-sale discount; borrower loses home and equity; political cost; slow in most legal systems |
| Sale to ARC / bad bank | Moves the loan off the bank at a discount, often with state guarantee | State carries the residual; borrower faces a distressed-debt buyer; resolution is litigation-driven |
| Rate subsidy / FX intervention | Government pays part of the interest or smooths the exchange rate | Fiscal cost every year or reserves burned; protects nobody's individual position; not a hedge |
| Individual hedging (IRS, CCS) | Locks rate or currency | Unavailable below institutional ticket sizes; requires ISDA capacity the borrower does not have |
| State guarantee / recapitalisation | Backstops the bank or the bad bank | Fiscal cost crystallises years later; moral hazard; the borrower is already out of the asset |
The gap the package fills
No conventional tool simultaneously (a) settles the bank at par or better, (b) leaves the borrower in the asset with title and rent, (c) puts recovery on a five-year clock with no instalment pressure, and (d) gives the same borrower — or his sovereign — an institutionally priced hedge against the rate or currency that caused the problem.
07 · Solution architecture
One Platform, Two Tracks, Five Components — MPCL Originates, Structures and Services; Never Lends
| Component | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Track A · A1 — NPL / NPA settlement & co-ownership | Settles a classified property-backed account at par or negotiated discount from programme capital; off-title contractual co-ownership; irrevocable registry hold until clearance; borrower keeps title and rent with a springing deduction right; five-year no-instalment, no-accrual recovery; terminal-event sale mandate as last resort | RBP-defined |
| Track A · A2 — Mortgage EMI Sleeping Period™ | Pauses a performing or watch-list borrower's instalment for 60 months (extendable to 15 years, no forced sale) while released equity in capital-protected instruments services the lender under coupon-first / springing-rental-second priority of payments | DFSA-approved · live |
| Track A · A3 — Equity Release – Double Rental™ | Releases 60–80% of property value into capital-protected instruments under mark-to-market controls (10% stop-loss) while the owner keeps rental; half of rental set aside as a secondary income pool; insurance wrap on the instrument leg | DFSA-approved · live |
| Track B · B1 — Fixed EMI for Life™ | Aggregates floating-rate loan pools into notional blocks; one interest-rate swap at a bank treasury under ISDA 2002 + CSA; fixed instalment passed to each borrower for the life of the loan; the lender's floating income unchanged | DFSA-approved · live |
| Track B · B2 — Corridor currency hedging | The same aggregation logic on cross-currency swaps and forwards — INR/AED/USD first — so rupee-income owners of dirham debt, dirham-income investors in rupee assets and FX-mismatched project borrowers receive an institutionally priced hedge | Structuring extension of B1 |
| Platform · C — OptimizerAI™ & Monidr | Allocation and monitoring engine — eligibility, scenario builder, portfolio lens, compliance engine, real-time pricing — with live risk reporting under continuous human oversight and weekly published results | Live · sovereign infrastructure ready |
- Settlement, not refinancing — the bank receives cash and books a settlement; no new credit to a classified borrower.
- Third-party capital, not bank funding — programme capital never comes from the lender being settled.
- Fair value, not accounting arbitrage — structured instruments fail SPPI under IFRS 9 and are carried at FVTPL — built on that basis, not around it.
- Coupon-first, springing-rental-second — rental is a perfected, springing assignment drawn only on shortfall; no self-servicing claims.
- Property stays 100% the client's — co-ownership is contractual and off-title; the registry hold protects the programme without transfer friction.
- Wholesale only — Professional Clients and public-sector counterparties; any retail participation is a partner bank's own execution plumbing.
08–09 · Track A & Track B
From Provisioned Account to Performing Position — and the Hedge Banks Buy for Themselves
Step 1
Loan tape
Classified property-backed accounts under NDA; screen for value ≥ ~3× balance, rental evidence, title status
Step 2
Mandate
Borrower mandates MPCL in writing: whole property is the base; deduction from rent; irrevocable terminal-event sale instruction
Step 3
Settlement
MPCL pays the bank at par or negotiated discount from programme capital; charge released, account reported settled
Step 4
Registry hold
Irrevocable hold until MPCL clearance; co-ownership contracted off-title
Step 5
Recovery
Five years, no instalments, no accrual; borrower keeps rent; deduction only on need; weekly reporting
Step 6
Exit
Refinance, sale at market or programme rollover; terminal-event sale only as last resort
| Party | Gain from Track A |
|---|---|
| Bank / state bank | Cash settlement; specific-provision and capital release; customer relationship preserved; no litigation |
| Borrower | Keeps title and rent; five years without instalment pressure; liability reduced by joint operation, not fire-sale |
| Government / bad bank | No guarantee call; tax base retained; eviction avoided; weekly audited results instead of court dates |
| Programme investor | Registry-protected co-ownership at a ~3× value cushion, serviced by rental with a terminal-event floor |
| Illustrative file · coupon-first (AED M) | Sleeping Period™ | Double Rental™ |
|---|---|---|
| Tranche / pledged instrument pool | 46.4 / 34.8 | 46.4 / 46.4 |
| Coupon cover · combined cover, worst stress | 1.17× · 1.75× | 1.56× · 1.98× |
| Rental drawn — base / combined worst case | nil / ≤29% of a year's rent | nil / ≤29% |
Universal Deal Calculator v3 run; per-file inputs replace these values for any nominated portfolio. Target programme vehicle USD 500M; first close USD 100–250M.
| Hedge economics | Individual | Pooled |
|---|---|---|
| ISDA / CSA access | None | MPCL faces the desk |
| Ticket size | Sub-institutional | USD 50–500M notional |
| Pricing | Retail margin or unavailable | Bank curve + disclosed spread |
| Fiscal cost | Subsidy if any | Nil — inside the fixed instalment |
Track B does not guarantee coupons or capital, does not speculate, does not face retail, and does not replace reserves policy — it removes individual positions from the queue that would otherwise need defending.
10 · The UAE corridor
One Hub, Many Feeders: Onshore Supervision, Offshore Market
| Corridor | Status · Sept 2026 | Track A entry | Track B entry | Government-side counterpart |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| India ↔ UAE · Route 1 | Corridor proposal submitted to DPIIT (cc PMO, DEA); GoI interest in talks; SEBI Cat I Special Situation AIF with GIFT City feeder in collaboration discussion | Property-backed NPA co-ownership settlement for PSU banks and ARCs; Sleeping Period EMI India variant | INR–AED–USD pooled hedge for diaspora owners and external borrowings; fixed-instalment pools for PSU / HFC books | DPIIT, DEA, RBI, IFSCA, SEBI; NARCL / IDRCL; PSU banks; NHB / HFCs |
| UAE hub | Three products live; ADCB, FAB, ENBD engagement; ~AED 500M classified book; USD 500M vehicle targeted (first close 100–250M) | Par settlement / discounted purchase with DLD hold; Sleeping Period™ to CBUAE as authorised framework | Pooled IRS lines at UAE treasuries; corridor CCS execution venue | CBUAE, DFSA, DLD; ADIA, Mubadala, ADQ, ADIC; Financial Stability Council |
| KSA ↔ UAE · Route 2 | Founder's prior KSA treasury tenure; expansion named in investor materials | Stressed mortgage / SME property books under Vision 2030 home-ownership targets; Shari'ah-consistent co-ownership | SAR–USD basis and fixed-instalment pools for housing-programme borrowers | SAMA, CMA, Real Estate Development Fund, SRC |
| Africa ↔ UAE · Route 3 | Angola USD 2.0B syndicated facility mandate (facilitator / arranger); Libya infrastructure briefs | Facilitator role for sovereign arrears; property-backed settlement where registries permit | USD–local-currency project-debt hedging with ECA and political-risk cover | Finance ministries; Afreximbank, AfDB, ATI / MIGA; ECAs |
| Europe · US · Routes 4–5 | IP registered at European IP Depository Berlin; US Government proposal workstream active with target agencies identified | Co-ownership exit for guaranteed NPL securitisation tails; US home-equity pool for rate-locked households; CRE settlement counterparty for regional banks | EUR/USD/AED hedging; fixed-payment conversion for HFA and GSE-eligible pools; USD leg for every corridor | National AMCs; ECB-supervised banks; Treasury, FHFA / GSEs, HUD / FHA, FDIC, state HFAs |
Why DIFC is the hub
Common-law jurisdiction with its own courts and established ISDA/CSA enforceability; the DIFC Client Wealth Account for programme funds; the DFSA is an IOSCO MMoU signatory, so a home central bank supervises the corridor through its own channels; an AED 5.56tn banking system with AED 1tn+ of derivative notional at a single bank; a dollar peg as a stable reference leg; CEPA plus the RBI–CBUAE local-currency framework.
Sparring note — why not onshore?
No single onshore market has all three of deep swap capacity, a common-law ISDA perimeter and neutral third-country standing with both the home regulator and international investors. Onshore feeders capture the supervision; the hub captures the market. Readiness over size: India is Route 1; the US is largest and slowest, but its dollar leg is in every corridor from day one.
11 · Engagement models
Five Ways a Government or Government-Backed Institution Works with MPCL
| Model | Counterparty provides | MPCL provides | Best first mover |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Framework authorisation | Regulatory recognition of the co-ownership settlement and pooled-hedge frameworks as permitted mechanisms inside a defined programme perimeter | Full documentation set, product rules, control regime, reporting template and audit trail; DFSA supervision as hub-side anchor; training for the onshore supervisor | Central bank · financial regulator · housing regulator |
| 2 · Nominated-portfolio settlement | A state bank or bad bank nominates a property-backed classified book under NDA; release-on-settlement protocol; registry-hold cooperation | Screening, borrower mandates, settlement funding, co-ownership contracting, five-year servicing, weekly audited results | State-bank remedial team · NARCL-type bad bank · national AMC |
| 3 · Sovereign programme vehicle | Anchor capital (debt or partial equity) into the USD 500M programme vehicle, or a guarantee that crowds in institutional and diaspora capital | Vehicle structuring, published audited NAV, 60–80% portfolio-backed release, mark-to-market and stop-loss controls, insurance wrap | Sovereign wealth fund · DFI · state housing fund |
| 4 · Hedging utility | Nomination of PSU, municipal, housing-agency or diaspora pools; authorised-dealer access onshore; benchmark and settlement conventions | Pool aggregation, notional sizing, ISDA/CSA execution at a DIFC treasury, fixed-instalment or capped-rate pass-through, weekly basis monitoring | Housing finance agency · infrastructure PSU · central-bank LCS desk |
| 5 · Housing-affordability policy tool | Adoption of Mortgage EMI Sleeping Period™ as a standing relief framework for a defined cohort — first-time buyers, forbearance-sunset accounts, disaster-affected regions | Eligibility engine, scenario builder, priority-of-payments rules, bank-side integration, published outcomes | Housing ministry · state mortgage guarantor |
Asked first · not asked
Asked: a named sponsor and a named portfolio or pool; authorisation inside a defined perimeter, not a market-wide rule change; cooperation on the registry-hold mechanism and the onshore feeder; agreement that results are audited and published weekly. Not asked: no fiscal line item, no guarantee call, no rate subsidy; no retail-facing role for the government; no exclusivity beyond the nominated programme; no capital before evidence.
Merit-based decision test
(1) Does it settle the bank without new credit to a classified borrower? (2) Does it keep the borrower in the asset with title? (3) Is the capital third-party and the accounting fair-value? (4) Are the results auditable weekly? If all four are yes, the residual objections are about novelty, not risk — and novelty is what a programme perimeter is for.
12–13 · Governance, impact & roadmap
Who Supervises This, What Happens When the Market Moves, and What the State Saves
| Corridor | Hub supervision | Onshore mirror | Registry-hold equivalent | Swap benchmark |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UAE | DFSA (MPCL) · CBUAE (bank counterparties) | — | Dubai Land Department mandate hold | EIBOR / DONIA |
| India | DFSA | IFSCA (GIFT unit) · RBI (authorised dealer) · SEBI (AIF feeder) | CERSAI charge + registered mortgage / lien — legal map required | MIBOR / MCLR · USD-INR |
| United States | DFSA | State HFA / GSE servicer · dealer bank | County deed-of-trust recording — legal map required | SOFR |
Three lines of defence
1st line — per-file eligibility, rental evidence, value cushion, mandate execution. 2nd line — mark-to-market (10% stop-loss), basis and prepayment monitoring, AML / sanctions, DFSA reporting. 3rd line — statutory audit, independent valuation, transaction advisory, weekly published results.
Accounting & prudential treatment
IFRS 9: structured instruments with embedded calls and barriers fail SPPI → FVTPL for every holder. Basel III SA for real-estate exposures; CRE22 collateral eligibility and haircuts mapped; SA-CCR and CVA / XVA for Track B swaps. Priority of payments: coupon-first, springing-rental-second.
| Illustrative value bridge · per USD 100M of Track A settlement capital | USD M |
|---|---|
| Settlement capital deployed | 100 |
| Bank provisions released (50% specific coverage) | 50 |
| Risk-weighted capacity freed (100% RW) | 100 |
| Collateral value retained (~3× cushion) | 300 |
| Guarantee calls avoided (~70% bad-bank discount) | up to 70 |
| Total system value per USD 100M | 620 |
Track B, per USD 250M pooled notional: 500–2,500 loans; rate certainty for the life of the loan; a 200bp move changes no instalment in the pool; fiscal cost to the sponsor nil. Milestones a sponsor can hold MPCL to: published audited vehicle NAV within 180 days of first close; weekly results from the first settlement onward; first pooled swap line under ISDA/CSA within 180 days; corridor legal map and Route 1 feeder within 180 days; independent valuation and transaction-advisory sign-off before any equity raise. No forward return is stated for any vehicle.
14 · Credentials & disclosures
Regulated, Protected, Validated
| Regulatory standing | Detail |
|---|---|
| Entity | Money Protects Capital Limited, DIFC |
| Licence | DFSA Category 3C · CL7741 · Firm Ref. F009299 · incl. Holding or Controlling Client Assets |
| Clients | Professional Clients (COB 2.3) and public-sector counterparties |
| Office | Park Tower B, Damac Park Towers, DIFC (2,500 sq ft) |
| Group | MP Financial Services L.L.C. (SCA licence applied for) · MP L.L.C-FZ (Meydan) · MP India Pvt. Ltd (representation office) |
Intellectual property
European IP Depository Berlin — registered 29 December 2021 · Berne Convention protection · UAE Ministry of Economy registration (INTEROCO). Registered marks: Mortgage EMI Sleeping Period™ · Equity Release – Double Rental™ · Fixed EMI for Life™. Licence-not-assignment architecture with the regulated entity.
Independent validation
Crowe Mak — pre-money valuation · Baker Tilly International — transaction advisory · Suntech Auditors and Consultants LLC — statutory audit · Expert House Chartered Accountants — finance and accounting.
Leadership
Mirza Ashraf Beg — Founder, Chairman and Senior Executive Officer. 25+ years in senior treasury and structured-finance roles across the UAE, Saudi Arabia and India (Commercial Bank of Dubai, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Sharjah Islamic Bank, Banque Saudi Fransi). Independent Director, MLRO and Compliance Officer in place.
Honest boundary. Capital-protected / asset-secured instruments carry issuer, market and counterparty risk and are fair-valued; hedges are collateralised swaps carrying counterparty and basis risk; co-ownership interests depend on collateral values and registry enforceability mapped corridor by corridor. Nothing here is a guarantee, a forecast or legal, tax or regulatory advice. Non-UAE figures are indicative regulator releases — re-verify before circulation to a specific government.
Next step
A forty-five-minute exploratory session under NDA with the sponsor's technical team, then nomination of one portfolio or one pool and a private assessment run through MPCL's scenario engine.
Mirza Ashraf Beg · +971 4 333 0181 · mirzabeg@moneyprotects.com · Park Tower B, DIFC, Dubai
Money Protects Capital Limited · DFSA Regulated · Category 3C · Licence CL7741 · DIFC, Dubai
Issued for information and discussion to Professional Clients, Market Counterparties and public-sector bodies as defined by the DFSA. Not an offer, solicitation or advice. All figures are indicative or sourced as stated. MPCL acts as originator, adviser and arranger; it is not a guarantor of any obligation.